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Immigration and the demand for life insurance: 
Evidence from Canada, 1911 




This paper analyses the determinants of the demand for life insurance using sample data from 
the 1911 Census of Canada. We find that immigrants’ demand for life insurance was on average 
around 13 percentage points lower than that of native-born Canadians, with the effect varying 
by province of settlement. We interpret these findings as evidence suggesting a greater appetite 
for risk among self-selecting immigrants relative to native-born Canadians.  We also uncover 
evidence of a slow assimilation of immigrants in terms of life insurance holdings, slower indeed 
than the process of assimilation in terms of earnings. 
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Introduction 
In the period from the turn of the 20th century up to the beginning of the Great War, Canada 
experienced rapid economic growth and high levels of immigration. On average, Canadian 
GNP increased annually by 6.21 per cent over the period, representing the highest level of real 
output growth that the Canadian economy has ever experienced (McInnis, 2008). From the 
onset of the 20th century until 1911, Canada’s population expanded by more than 33 per cent, 
which was almost entirely due to the arrival of around 1.8m immigrants (The Canada 
Yearbook, 1911). Those developments coincided with an equally remarkable growth of the 
Canadian insurance market, which became increasingly important for investment and the 
continued expansion of the Canadian economy, as well as for protecting households from 
increasing levels of income risk associated with growing urbanisation and industrialisation. 
The nominal value of life insurance policies in force increased by a factor of ten between 1875 
and 1910, while in the first decade of the 20th century alone life insurance companies in Canada 
more than doubled their total assets (Canada Yearbook, 1911). An important element in 
understanding this growth is an appreciation of the factors that influenced the demand for life 
insurance among Canadian households and, in particular, what role immigration played in this 
process.  
In this study we investigate the determinants of insurance demand and direct the focus 
on the issue of immigration. The time period under investigation is interesting, not only due to 
its remarkable population growth dynamics - in particular the very high share of new 
immigrants - but also as it creates a unique setting for research on risk attitudes of immigrants. 
It is also rare to have the opportunity to study household preferences free from any interference 
of government-provided insurance. In 1911 state sponsored substitutes for private insurance 
were unavailable and governmental involvement in the Canadian insurance market was only 
in a regulatory capacity. Furthermore, employers were unlikely to provide workers with life 
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insurance (Di Matteo and Emery, 2002). Therefore the decision to purchase insurance at this 
point in time can be viewed as being based purely on private motivations. 
The presence of formal financial services such as life insurance is often suggested as a 
crucial factor for growth of developing countries (Brainard, 2008). Insurance companies’ role 
is not only in the provision of investment funds, but also in increasing the efficiency of 
diversification of individual household risk. In the absence of well-developed insurance 
markets, households are forced to rely on sub-optimal informal insurance arrangements, such 
as holding cash savings or the accumulation of physical asset stocks (Rosenzweig, 2001). The 
availability of formal insurance can therefore provide a more efficient mechanism for poor 
households to pool idiosyncratic risk. Not surprisingly, the development of the insurance 
market in Canada during the late 19th century was regarded of vital importance to Canadian 
development (Drummond, 1962).  
The database used in this research is a five per cent representative sample of the 
population of Canada constructed by the Canadian Century Research Infrastructure (CCRI) 
and based on the 1911 Census. To the best of our knowledge, the underlying study is the first 
to use this large and comprehensive database for research on insurance holdings in Canada. 
The data set contains detailed records regarding holdings and value of life insurance as well as 
a wide selection of control variables, including the respondent’s place of birth and, for 
immigrants, the date of arrival in Canada. Furthermore, the data records the province of birth 
and residence of Canadian-born respondents, which allows us to also identify internal migrants. 
It is important to note that enumerators were instructed to record life insurance holdings 
“whether in an old line company, an assessment company or fraternal organization” (Census 
and Statistics Office, 1911). The insurance variables therefore capture not only the contracts 
purchased from commercial providers but also from informal organizations, such as burial 
societies. This broad coverage of insurance providers therefore reduces the problem of pricing 
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of insurance for migrants, as fraternal societies would likely have provided an alternative to 
formal contracts.1 Based on around 72,000 observations of household heads, we estimate the 
probability of holding life insurance as a function of the available control variables.2 We find 
that immigrants were around 12.8 percentage points less likely to purchase life insurance. The 
probability that an immigrant holds life insurance increases during the first forty years or so 
after immigration before it begins to fall. The findings provide an indication of the existence 
of a lower risk aversion among immigrants.  
This study provides two main contributions. First, it adds to the large literature on 
immigration to the New World and assimilation of immigrants into North American labour 
markets. Hatton (1997), examining data from Michigan and California in the late 19th century 
found that immigrants assimilated well in terms of earnings. Indeed for those immigrants that 
arrived as children, earnings were very similar to native-born workers once they reach 
adulthood, while adult immigrants from Britain actually earned more than the native-born in 
Michigan. The assimilation of immigrants to Canada in the early 20th century has been 
examined by Green and MacKinnon (2001). They used a sample of the 1901 census to explore 
how quickly immigrants’ earnings caught up with those of native-born, English mother-tongue 
Canadians. Even though British migrants were seen as “invisible immigrants” (p.335), in that 
they faced the fewest barriers to assimilation such as language and legal system; nonetheless, 
English immigrants assimilated slowly and achieve earnings parity only 28 to 49 years after 
immigration. In this paper we show that there existed an even slower rate of assimilation in 
relation to the purchase of life insurance. This may indicate that differences between 
immigrants and native-born Canadians were attributable not only to cultural, economic and 
discriminatory factors, but are also possibly related to differing risk attitudes.  
Second, this paper contributes to research on historical insurance holding. A study 
conducted by Di Matteo and Emery (2002) is of particular relevance to this analysis due to the 
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common period and country under examination. The study investigates the relationship 
between personal wealth and demand for life insurance, based on male probated decedents in 
Ontario in 1892. Consistent with theoretical literature on the demand for life insurance, and 
contrary to the findings in much of the empirical literature, wealth accumulation was found to 
be a substitute for market purchases of life insurance. Di Matteo and Emery’s evidence suggests 
that households primarily demanded life insurance when they lacked accumulated reserves or 
wealth to provide self-insurance, often early in the life cycle. To some extent this study will 
draw on their analysis but will differ with respect to the specific research motivation and 
variables under scrutiny. The principal focus of this study is the relationship between insurance 
uptake and immigration. Any difference between the agrarian, newly settled West and the 
relatively urbanised East or Central Canada is also investigated. The additional information 
uncovered in this analysis can be combined with Di Matteo and Emery’s investigation and 
should help deepen the understanding of the determinants of insurance demand during this 
period in Canada. 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. In section 2 a historical background of 
Canada in 1911 is presented. Section 3 reviews literature on the demand for life insurance, 
while Section 4 introduces the data used. The results of our analysis are presented in section 5, 
before Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Canada in 1911 
The period from Confederation in 1867 to the beginning of the Great War was a time of 
significant economic and demographic change for Canada. The population more than doubled 
from 3.5 million in 1867 to 7.9 million by 1914. During the years 1901 to 1911 alone, the 
population grew from 5.4 million to 7.2 million. This growth was driven predominantly by 
  6 
high levels of immigration with an average annual immigration of around 150,000 over the 
period from 1901 to 1911 (Canada Yearbook, 1911, 1914). Immigrants came from all corners 
of the globe, but government immigration policy favoured settlers from European countries.3 
The vast majority of new settlers came from the British Isles due to the strong cultural and 
economic links that existed between Britain and her former colony. A principal reason for the 
high levels of immigration was a concerted effort on behalf of the Canadian government to 
extend its control over the western provinces, particularly the Prairie provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, by encouraging settlement there. In an effort to achieve this goal, 
the government passed the Dominion Lands Act in 1872. The act outlined that lands were to 
be given to settlers in return for the payment of a $10 fee and the performance of specified 
duties – e.g., building a habitable residence and cultivating a certain area annually (Regehr, 
2011). Despite these efforts Canada actually experienced net emigration in the late 19th century 
(Green and MacKinnon, 2001). However the “Golden age of Canadian development” (p.316) 
began at the turn of the 20th century as immigration took off. Consequently the population of 
the Prairie provinces increased dramatically; the populations of Alberta and Saskatchewan 
increased by more than 400 per cent between 1901 and 1911 (Canada Yearbook, 1911). This 
increase, coupled with an expansion of the western railway network, led to an agricultural 
boom driven largely by the production of wheat. Canada became a major player on the world 
wheat markets with a 14 per cent share of world wheat exports in 1914 (Solberg, 1987 p.36). 
The country also became a significant exporter of animal products, fishery products and 
minerals (New York Times, 1912). However the boom was not only driven by agriculture, with 
domestic investment and manufacturing also contributing to rapid economic growth (Bothwell 
et al., 1990).  
Alongside these rapidly expanding sectors, Canada’s financial sector grew alike. The 
insurance sector in Canada was well developed by the beginning of the 20th century 
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(Drummond, 1962). The value of life insurance in force in Canada rose from $64 million (1900 
Canadian dollars) in 1875 to $679 million by 1910, while the total assets of Canadian life 
insurance companies rose from a value of $118 million in 1901 to $212 million by 1911 
(Canada Yearbook, 1911).4 Total assets owned in 1911 by life insurance companies were 
valued 86 per cent higher than the assets owned by the Canadian State. In comparison to the 
manufacturing industry: assets owned by life insurance companies were valued at 29 per cent 
of the entire manufacturing sector in Canada (capitalisation of manufacturing firms was equal 
to $847 million in 1911, Canada Yearbook, 1911).  
Insurance companies were also a major player in capital markets, lending more money 
in mortgages in the decade before the Great War than the designated mortgage companies, 
while at the same time becoming heavily involved in the Canadian bond market (Drummond, 
1962). The fact that the insurance industry in Canada had spread far and wide by the beginning 
of the 20th century was noted by the author Arthur Granville Bradley:  
Insurance is a very prominent business in Canada, and Toronto is one of its 
chief headquarters, sending out troops of agents over the whole country as far 
as the Pacific coast. I know there are insurance agents in England from modest 
notices hanging here or there on the walls of shop or office, but in Canada you 
may travel with a whole smoking compartment full of them, and dine at tables 
in hotels where there is no one else... I do not think there is a man of substance 
in Canada uninsured, not because prudence is a specially Canadian virtue, but 
in view of the number of insurance agents perennially on the warpath... 
(Bradley, 1903 p.225) 
Despite this seemingly intense competition, the insurance market in Canada continued to be 
profitable. In 1910 the net income on premiums paid by the insured was equal to $28.9 million 
(1900 Canadian dollars). A further $8.9 million income was obtained from investments on the 
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capital markets. The total cash income of life companies was equal to $39.7 million which 
constitutes a remarkably high return on the companies’ total assets of 18.7 per cent (Canada 
Yearbook, 1911).  
The high profits earned by the life insurance companies led the public to believe that 
the accumulated premiums were not being invested in the best interests of the policy holders 
and that company directors were operating imprudently. As a result of this speculation a Royal 
Commission on Life Insurance Companies was established to investigate these claims in 1906. 
The commission found evidence of improper management of funds by the life insurance 
companies and recommended amendments to legislation to protect the policy holders’ interests. 
The commission’s report became the basis for the Insurance Act of 1910, which was designed 
to better regulate the growing Canadian insurance market (Bishop, 1912).  
The number of Canadian life insurance companies grew rapidly over the last decades 
of the 19th century, increasing from one company (Canada Life) in 1870 to seventeen in 1900, 
although as in the US, the industry remained concentrated (Davis and Gallman, 2001 p.431; 
Keller, 1999). By 1911, the Canadian insurance market had a handful of dominant domestic 
players which operated alongside competitors from the United States and the United Kingdom. 
This competition induced Canadian companies to also increase their foreign operations. In 
1914 some 40% of life insurance premiums were collected by foreign companies while 
Canadian life insurance companies received 32% of their premium income from abroad 
(Drummond, 1962).  
Life insurance in Canada was indeed an important financial asset, both as a form of 
income protection for households and to Canadian Capital markets as a source of funds for 
investment. The maturing of the population over the period of economic and geographic 
expansion increased the demand for insurance, while competition among the major companies 
boosted supply. As a result, the proportion of the population holding a life insurance policy 
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steadily increased. According to Di Matteo and Emery (2002) 18 per cent of Canadian males 
held life insurance in 1901. Based on the five per cent census sample, 32 per cent of male 
household heads held life insurance by 1911. When compared to other countries, the Canadian 
life insurance industry appears well developed relative to the most advanced economies of the 
time: the United States and the United Kingdom. Life insurance premiums per capita collected 
in Canada were only slightly lower than in the United Kingdom in 1911.5  
 
2. Demand for Life Insurance 
The demand for life insurance has commonly been linked with the motivation to accumulate 
assets. Life insurance is judged to be an asset similar in form to savings and is as such, 
important to a household’s life time utility maximisation strategy. The motivation to save or 
acquire insurance, as outlined by Di Matteo and Emery (2002), can be explained in three 
principal ways; the life-cycle motivation, the bequest motivation and the precautionary savings 
motivation. According to Di Matteo and Emery (2002 pp.450-453), the bequest motive is 
defined as the accumulation of assets during working years in order to provide offspring with 
an inheritance, while precautionary savings is defined as the accumulation of assets to deal 
with short-term unforeseen economic events. The life-cycle theory predicts that households 
wish to smooth consumption over their life time and that individuals accumulate assets during 
their working lives and consume these assets in retirement (Jappelli and Modigliani, 2006). 
The idea of a hump shaped wealth-age curve would imply that savings would be low, perhaps 
even negative, early on in the life cycle. This form of life-cycle asset accumulation behaviour 
has been identified by Di Matteo (1997) in Canadian data from the late 19th century. Life-cycle 
savings motivations likely gained in importance as the number of individuals reaching 
retirement age increased over the course of the 19th century. Indeed the transition to a “modern” 
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definition of retirement may have taken place earlier than was once thought (Carter and Sutch, 
1996). 
[Table 1 about here] 
This study has a particular focus on the potential difference in insurance demand 
between self-selecting migrants relative to non-migrants. On the one hand, demand for life 
insurance may be greater among immigrants as their potential for self-insurance would be 
diminished. Immigrants would likely have less capacity for informal risk sharing as private 
networks are often initially less extensive. On the other, demand for life insurance may be 
lower for immigrants if the individuals who emigrate have a below average level of risk 
aversion. Jaeger et al. (2010) show this to be the case for contemporary German migrants: 
individuals who are relatively willing to take risks show a significantly higher probability to 
migrate. The authors further suggest that the United States may enjoy a higher degree of labour 
mobility today in part due to the fact that it has experienced many waves of immigrants who 
are likely to have been risk takers. A study by Di Matteo (1996) of the wealth holdings of Irish-
born and non-Irish-born in Ontario in 1892 finds no connection between birthplace and wealth 
overall, but there is an indication that the Irish-born were less likely to hold financial assets. 
Furthermore, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2002) find that immigrants have a lower propensity 
to accumulate precautionary savings, and it is possible that the demand for insurance follows a 
similar pattern. However, a decrease in precautionary savings may be due to the impact of 
remittances on saving capabilities. It might be expected then that the length of time since 
immigration would diminish the influence of both these effects, as more extensive family risk 
sharing networks evolve and immigrants become assimilated. A greater appreciation of 
attitudes towards risk among immigrants and their assimilation could therefore potentially lead 
to an improved understanding of differences in labour mobility across countries and over time. 
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A number of factors that potentially influence the demand for life insurance have been 
identified; factors that would likely have been different for immigrants and native-born. 
Theories of insurance demand predict that insurance purchase is related to the motivation to 
preserve income streams, so that the individual can provide for himself and his family. Income 
streams could be interrupted by illness, accidents or other unforeseen economic hardships. 
Insurance can protect households from a collapse in their consumption that would otherwise 
follow a break of income. Savings, often referred to as self-insurance, could also provide this 
function. However, savings take time to accumulate, which for recent immigrants is a particular 
constraint. As such, immigrants might be expected to have greater need for insurance to 
substitute for savings. Likewise insurance would represent a better instrument by which to 
preserve future household consumption early in the life cycle and implies that insurance 
purchase would be negatively related to age (Hammond et al., 1967). The bequest motivation 
for the acquisition of life insurance can be seen as an extension of the life cycle motivation. As 
transfers across generations link the life cycle of the household head to that of its dependents, 
the relevant utility maximising economic agent may be the household itself and not the 
household head. The purchase of life insurance is seen as a transaction made on behalf of the 
insured dependents, where the principal intention is to provide offspring with an economic 
safety net of their own (Lewis, 1989). It is not clear that the bequest motivation would influence 
immigrants and native-born differently. 
Household income is also considered to have a significant effect on the level of life 
insurance demand. The relationship between income and the demand for life insurance is, 
however, argued to be complex and depends on the degree of household risk aversion and how 
it changes with income (Cleeton and Zellner, 1993). Households in which the income of the 
household head represents the only stream of income would be expected to have a higher 
demand for life insurance while households with more than one income – and therefore less 
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reliant on the income of the household head - would be likely to have less need to insure the 
household head (Di Matteo and Emery, 2002). This theory finds support in evidence provided 
by Duker (1969) and Kantor and Fishback (1996) with respect to the insurance demand of 
households with working wives. Since differences existed between the income and occupations 
of immigrant and native-born, we control for these variables in the empirical analysis. 
A further variable that is considered to affect the level of life insurance demand is the 
level of education, as it is associated with a better understanding of the benefits of life insurance 
(Truett and Truett, 1990). A variable indicating whether the respondent could read and write is 
therefore included in the analysis, as is a variable indicating whether or not individual could 
speak an official language. 
Whether the respondent lived in an urban area is also likely to have affected both the 
supply and demand for insurance. Those living in urban areas were more likely to be reliant on 
the labour income of the household head than farmers and farm-workers (Di Matteo and Emery, 
2002), while access to insurance services would have been less costly for urban dwellers. 
Immigrants too tended to be concentrated in urban areas. To further examine the supply of 
insurance, a variable is created indicating the concentration of insurance agents and brokers 
within the census district. As local networks are expected to have been important to insurance 
agents in identifying potential customers, we also include a measure of the number of insurance 
agents and brokers of the same ethnicity as the individual that reside in the same district. The 
role of connections is also recognised by a contemporary source that gives advice to insurance 
agents in the USA: “The securing of an application depends upon the creation of confidence 
which may be difficult to effect in the case of an entire stranger” (Spectator Company, 1916, 
p. 33). As such we hope to capture an informal, yet potentially important, aspect of insurance 
supply that may have particular relevance for immigrants.6  
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3. Data 
To estimate the demand for insurance in early 20th century Canada, we make use of the five 
per cent sample of the 1911 census of Canada constructed by the Canadian Century Research 
Infrastructure (CCRI). The questions that make the 1911 Canadian Census unique and therefore 
facilitate our analysis are, of course, those relating to insurance. The enumerators were asked 
to record the details of an individual’s life insurance holdings, namely the total value of the life 
insurance policies in force and the total cost per year of premiums on all insurance policies. 
The insurance holdings include both formal contracts signed with insurance providers and 
informal agreements entered with fraternal organisations, burial societies and similar 
institutions.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The sample consisting of data for household heads is summarised in Table 2. The first three 
columns describe native-born Canadians in the sample, while the last three provide information 
for the sub-sample of immigrants.7 Canadian-born individuals encompassed by the sample are 
in 91 per cent of cases male and have an average age of 45 years. 81 per cent of native-born 
household heads are reported as being married. The average number of dependent children – 
that is, children aged 16 or under – is equal to 1.8 per household. Approximately 74 per cent 
of the sample was born in Canada while the remaining immigrated predominantly from 
England, followed by the United States, Scotland and Ireland. The sub-sample of immigrants 
reveals very similar characteristics to the native-born sample, with the main differences that 
immigrants were somewhat less likely to be married and had fewer dependent children. For 
immigrants the year of arrival in Canada was also recorded. The sample data indicate that the 
average number of years since immigration was around 11 years. The variables of most 
importance to this analysis are those concerning life insurance holdings. 31 per cent of the 
native-born sub-sample reported holding a life insurance policy with an average value of $2029 
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and an average annual premium of $86. The proportion of immigrants’ holding life insurance 
is about 24 per cent. The average value of life insurance, as well as the premium for life 
insurance, are somewhat lower for immigrants than for those born in Canada, however the 
median value of an insurance policy was identical.8  
The occupation of the household head is separated into twelve categories according to 
the classification method provided by the census authorities. There appears to be little 
difference between the occupational structure of immigrants and native-born Canadians, 
although there were likely to have been differences within these broad sectoral classifications.9 
According to this classification, 45 per cent of the native-born sub-sample was recorded by the 
enumerator as working in agriculture.10 Tenant farmers and land-owning farmers had a degree 
of income risk protection, in so much as other members of the household could assist in farm 
work. As such, both types of farmers could avail of risk management and diversification 
techniques that to some extent decreased their exposure to income shocks (Stead, 2004). The 
direction of the influence of being a farmer on the demand for insurance might presumably be 
expected to be similar for both tenant and land-owning farmers. Additionally, farm land can be 
seen as an asset and hence a land-owning farmer could rely on that land as a substitute asset to 
insurance, therefore having less need for formal insurance contracts.11 The sub-sample of 
immigrants discloses a somewhat lower share of farmers than the sample as a whole. As the 
title “farmer” tells us little of the economic position of the household head, in the analysis that 
follows a variable is constructed that identifies farmers that were self-employed and also 
employed others, in this way separating farmers that were likely to have been more affluent 
from poorer farmers. 
In this study, in addition to occupation controls, we have records that indicate the total 
household income for 57 per cent of households.12 Interestingly, incomes are higher on average 
for immigrants than for native-born Canadians. As farmers did not usually report income on 
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their returns, the data on income is somewhat biased towards non-farmers, who were more 
likely to purchase a life insurance policy. A similar problem is encountered by Di Matteo and 
Emery (2002), who do not have any income records and are forced to rely on the occupation 
variables that provide some approximation for the missing variable. For immigrants, the 
income of the household head contributed, on average, 76% of total household income, while 
for native-born this figure was 82%. 
Panel E reveals that both native-born Canadians and immigrants were highly literate. 
86 per cent of immigrants spoke English. Only 5 per cent spoke French compared to 32 per 
cent for the native-born. The greatest differences between the native-born sub-sample and the 
sub-sample of immigrants can be observed with respect to religion (Panel F). Catholics are the 
most numerous group in the full sample, with the rest being mainly Methodists, Presbyterians 
or Anglicans. Immigration from other countries such as Catholic France was much less 
significant. Consistently, the sub-sample of immigrants includes fewer Catholics and more 
Anglicans, Lutherans, Jews and other religions. Settlement patterns also differed between the 
native born and the immigrant population. Immigrants were more likely to live in urban areas 
and were more concentrated in the western provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan. These geographical differences and whether this is related to the demand 
for life insurance will be explored in more detail in the next section. 
 
4. Empirics 
In order to uncover the factors influencing whether a household head possessed a life insurance 
policy in Canada in 1911, a binary response approach is required. In this formulation the 
outcome of the discrete choice, to hold an insurance policy or not, is viewed as a reflection of 
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an underlying Probit model. The model is estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, 
and marginal effects are computed at the means of the independent variables.13 
The results are presented in columns (1) to (4) of Table 3. The first column summarises 
the point estimates for a regression with a set of control variables that potentially influence the 
decision to obtain life insurance, as has been discussed in section 3. Of main interest is the 
indicator function Immigrant, which takes the value one if the individual immigrated to Canada 
as an adult and zero otherwise.14 The point estimate is highly significant and indicates that 
immigrants were about 12.8 percentage points less likely to hold life insurance than native-
born Canadians, all else being equal. It can be also observed that the remaining control 
variables remain consistent with expectations and previous research; in particular with Di 
Matteo and Emery (2002). The probability of holding life insurance increases if the head of the 
household is male or married. The estimated coefficients on the quadratic age polynomial 
indicate that the probability of holding life insurance increases with age, albeit at a decreasing 
rate.15 Each additional dependent child (aged 16 or under) is not statistically related to the 
probability of holding life insurance. One may speculate that the absence of a significant 
association is due to the presence of more than one contradictory forces at play. On one hand, 
having more children is a substitute for insurance (as children can provide support for parents 
in old age), leading to lower insurance demand. On the other, having children makes your life 
more valuable (as one needs to cater for children; children are also those who obtain the 
insurance payment in case of death), therefore higher demand for insurance. A further 
exploration of this finding, although interesting, lies however beyond the scope of this paper.16 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Being able to read and write increases the probability of holding life insurance by 
around 18 percentage points. A higher probability is also observed for those who speak an 
official language or live in urban agglomerations.17 The probability of holding life insurance 
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increases with income at a decreasing rate, while the probability of holding life insurance is 
higher for most professional categories compared to employment in agriculture, the baseline 
category (not reported).18 Being a self-employed farmer-employer has an insignificant effect 
on the demand for life insurance.19 The point estimate for the introduced insurance supply 
proxy is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that having more insurance agents 
of the same ethnicity in your district increased the probability that you held life insurance. This 
is indeed an interesting result as it suggests that agents were recruiting from within their own 
ethnic groups. Furthermore, the result provides support for the advice given to insurance agents 
by the Spectator Company (1916, p. 33) that “connection is a valuable factor” in finding 
prospective insurance buyers. Finally, the regression also includes a set of indicators for each 
province with Ontario as the reference category (not reported).20 
Next, we estimate a further regression with a set of controls for the country of birth. We 
use Canadian-born individuals as the base category and a set of indicator functions for the 
remaining countries of origin. In column (2), the coefficients on country of origin are always 
negative and statistically significant. The smallest marginal effects of between four and eight 
percentage points are found for individuals born in Scotland, Ireland, the USA and England. 
This is followed by Germany (12.6%), Sweden (17.0%), the Rest of Europe and Rest of World 
categories (each ca. 18%), while the remaining countries for which we have a reasonable 
number of observations are 30 percentage points below the probability of holding insurance by 
Canadians. One could suspect that the results are to some extent affected by unobserved 
preferences and social norms with regard to insurance demand that may differ across countries 
and cultures. However, given the significant difference between immigrants born in the USA 
and Canada, and the high degree of similarity between these two countries, we believe, the 
results are attributable to more than simply to unobserved cultural differences, and interpret 
them as being suggestive of a lower level of risk aversion among immigrants. Furthermore, the 
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relatively small difference for the USA and the British Isles compared to other parts of the 
world might be reflective of the fact that cultural and geographic distance are also important. 
The remaining variables in this model are consistent with the specification presented in column 
(1). 
In column (3), further controls for religious background of the respondent are included. 
This step is motivated by Di Matteo and Emery (2002) who found heterogeneity in insurance 
demand depending on religious background. The authors speculate that Roman Catholics might 
have been less well-informed about the benefits of life insurance, as they were somewhat less 
literate than the average, and hence would demand less insurance. Since in our model we 
account for literacy, this argument does not apply.21 Furthermore, since Anglican and 
Protestants were substantially more influential in the banking and finance sector, it could be 
further the case that they are more aware of the diversification advantages of the life insurance 
asset, although a confirmation of this explanation is unfortunately not possible in our 
specification. The influence of religion on the probability of holding life insurance is positive 
and statistically significant only for Methodists, Baptists and Presbyterians, with Roman 
Catholics as the base category. The results also indicate that Jews and Lutherans demanded 
less insurance than Catholics, whereas Anglican and Protestants exhibit insurance demand that 
is indistinguishable from Catholics. Nonetheless, most importantly for the aim of this paper, it 
can be also be observed that in this specification the coefficient for immigrants remains very 
consistent in sign, size and significance compared with the baseline model from column (1). 
This supports the view that demand for insurance is influenced by whether the individual was 
a migrant or Canadian-born.  
Each specification so far includes individual province fixed effects. In column (4) we 
group all nine covered provinces into three regions: the East (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island and New Brunswick), the Center (Quebec and Ontario) and the West (Manitoba, 
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Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia).22 For simplicity we now include only dummies 
for the East and West, with Center as the baseline category. The marginal effects of East and 
West are both negative and imply a demand for life insurance that is 14.3 or 2.6 percentage 
points lower than the Center, respectively. At the same time we introduce interaction terms 
between being an immigrant and the geographic regions where the immigrant resides. This 
informs us about the life insurance demand by immigrants in the studied regions relative to all 
Canadian-born respondents. The emerging point estimates are all negative and highly 
significant. Immigrants living in the Western provinces are the least likely to hold life insurance 
(16 percentage points less than Canadian-born), followed by the central provinces (11 
percentage points), whereas a lower probability of only about 6 percentage points characterises 
the Eastern provinces. This result highlights the differences between the settlement patterns of 
immigrants, whereby newly arrived immigrants were more likely to settle in the west. A slow 
assimilation process may therefore go some way to explain these geographic differences.23  
In order to enable visual inspection of the results, we construct figures based on Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques using a specification with the set of controls shown in column (1) of 
Table 3.24 Figure 1 illustrates how the probability of holding life insurance changes over the 
lifetime for individuals of various nationalities. This visualises that immigrants in general have 
lower probabilities of holding life insurance. It also shows that life insurance holding peaks at 
around age 45 for all nationalities before declining to below 10% by age 85. Immigrants from 
countries such as the USA, Scotland and England display a similar relationship between life 
insurance and age while for countries such as Russia and China, the relationship is flatter and 
less hump-shaped.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
We next direct our attention to the issue of assimilation and extend the specification by 
the time that had elapsed since immigration. Following Green and MacKinnon (2001), we set 
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the years since immigration variable equal to zero for those born in Canada. The coefficient on 
this variable can be thus interpreted as the assimilation effect (i.e. no assimilation effect 
estimated for Canadians). The identification therefore allows the entry effect to vary by place 
of birth, but imposes a constant assimilation effect (coefficient on years since migration). 
Column (1) in Table 4 reports the baseline specification extended by the measure of time since 
immigration. The disclosed point estimate is positive and implies a one percentage point 
increase in insurance demand for every year that elapsed since immigration to Canada; the 
effect is however non-linear and occurs at a diminishing rate. We next estimate two linear 
regressions with the logged value of life insurance and logged income as the dependent variable 
respectively. This allows us to estimate, in analogy to Green and MacKinnon, years to income 
equality for immigrants from any nation and then compare it with years to equality in insurance 
value. Time to assimilation in either of the variables is calculated as the negative ratio between 
the coefficient estimated for a nationality group divided by the assimilation effect.  As can be 
viewed in column (2), the implied years to equality of life insurance value to a native-born 
person (entry effect divided by assimilation effect) are fairly substantial. For example, for 
English-born immigrants time to equality is about 25 years; at the same time, income equality 
is reached within about 20 years. The fastest assimilation time can be observed for USA-born 
immigrants who reach equality of insurance value within about nine years. Interestingly, 
according to our regression, income of immigrants from the US is actually higher than that of 
Canadians. Comparing the results with Green and MacKinnon’s earnings equality, which is 
reached within roughly seven years, it takes two additional years to reach equality in insurance 
value. One might expect that assimilation of USA-born would be rapid, since their background 
matched closely that of the resident population, but this appears not to have been the case. 
Again, the persistent gap in insurance demand (and not in earnings) may be interpreted as a 
sign of varying risk attitudes between migrants and non-migrants. The assimilation process is 
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also significant for immigrants from other parts of Europe or other parts of the world and lasts 
typically around 20 years. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Figure 2 presents the probability of owning life insurance by immigrants as a function 
of years that elapsed since their arrival in Canada, while holding all other variables at their 
mean. It can be observed that immigrants increase their life insurance holdings over a long time 
period lasting around 45 years after their arrival in Canada. The demand, however, begins to 
fall for individuals who immigrated more than around five decades ago.  
These interpretations must be made, however, under the cautionary note of a limited 
number of observations for individuals who immigrated a very long time ago. Furthermore, 
since we have only a cross-section database at our disposal, two important biases arise: cohort 
effects and survivorship bias. We are not able to illuminate to what extent the concave 
relationship between insurance holdings and the time that elapsed since immigration is caused 
by cohort heterogeneity. Such cohort effects could be a result of, for example, some 
unobservable differences between generations. In addition, it is possible that due to some 
unobserved reasons, certain types of people have died younger and if their unobserved 
characteristics are correlated with life insurance holdings, our estimates would be biased.  
Arguably, the inclusion of a wide set of control variables to some extent mitigates such a bias; 
nonetheless any interpretation of these results has to be undertaken with care.25  
[Figure 2 about here] 
A principal aim of this research is to uncover the level of demand for life insurance 
among migrants relative to non-migrants. The results so far indicate that, on average, 
immigrants are likely to have a lower level of demand for life insurance. A related question is 
whether internal migrants are also characterised by a lower insurance demand. Table 5 presents 
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results for the sub-sample of Canadian-born household heads. Column (1) contains a dummy 
variable to identify whether the person has been born in a different province than where he/she 
is surveyed. The coefficient on this variable is negative, however very close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. The remaining control variables are very robust for the sub-sample 
of Canadian-born. 
We next exploit geographic information on the origin and destination of the internal 
migrants and, in analogy to the previous approach, we group provinces into three regions: the 
East, Center and West. The specification presented in column (2) reports not only the effect of 
the region of residence, but also the effect of the province of birth. In line with the previous 
results we find in general a lower insurance demand in the East and West of Canada, compared 
to the central provinces. The differences in insurance demand depending on region of birth are 
significant between migrants and non-migrants. The negative marginal effects imply that 
migrants demand less insurance compared to those who did not migrate and were born in the 
same region. For example, internal migrants from the Eastern provinces demanded about 26 
percentage points less insurance than non-migrants born in the East. Interestingly, migrants 
also appear to demand more insurance than the residents at the destination.  
[Table 5 about here] 
A concern with the potential to undermine our analysis of differences in insurance 
demand between immigrants and native-born is that of endogeneity. The estimated negative 
associations between the immigrant dummy and the probability of holding life insurance can 
be interpreted in two ways. It could be the case that immigrants demanded less insurance 
because they have lower levels of risk aversion or, alternatively, that insurance companies offer 
them insurance at higher prices because immigrants were seen as more “risky”. If the latter was 
the case it might be expected that immigrants who did purchase life insurance were charged 
higher premiums. To explore this, we run two additional regressions, one for immigrants and 
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the other for internal migrants, and investigate the existence of any differences in the insurance 
price paid by immigrants. The results are presented in Table 6. The model estimates the annual 
premium paid for life insurance (used as an approximation for insurance price) and uses the 
previous set of control variables, extended by a measure of the value of life insurance to account 
for the fact that a more valuable policy is more expensive. The point estimates on the variables 
identifying immigrants or internal migrants are insignificant implying that being a migrant had 
no impact on the premium paid. This suggests that differences in insurance purchases were not 
being driven by higher prices faced by immigrants. 
[Table 6 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the demand for life insurance among household heads in Canada in 
1911, placing a particular focus on differences between natives and immigrants. This important 
time period in Canadian history is characterised by the remarkable growth of both the economy 
and the population. Moreover, state intervention on the equally rapidly growing insurance 
market was limited only to regulatory actions. As a result, the decision of a household to 
purchase insurance at this point in time can be viewed as being based on purely private 
motivations with the aim of ensuring the best well-being and continued prosperity of their 
family. Increasing life expectancy meant that the accumulation of assets became more 
important than ever before while a growing reliance on human capital derived earnings ensured 
that the income required to obtain these assets became ever more subject to risk. Life insurance 
could act as an instrument by which to accumulate assets and protect against risk at the same 
time. 
Based on a sample from the Census of Canada we investigate those motivations with a 
particular focus on immigrants. Holding all else equal, the results indicate that immigrants were 
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on average around 13 percentage points less likely to hold life insurance than individuals born 
in Canada. What is more, the analysis suggests that this was not due to the preferential pricing 
of insurance contracts in favour of native-born Canadians. Geographic differences are also 
found to be important, with insurance demand among immigrants differing depending on place 
of settlement. We also uncover evidence that immigrants took a relatively long time to 
assimilate in terms of life insurance, longer than it took to assimilate in terms of earnings.  
The results for internal migrants are not as strong as those for migrants from abroad. 
However, the decision to move within the same country is associated with lower risk than 
moves across borders and as such attitudes towards risk would likely have less of a bearing on 
the decision to migrate. Furthermore, it important to note that the sample of Canadians is 
somewhat peculiar, as the vast majority of individuals are themselves a descendent of a migrant 
(even if not necessarily in the first generation). It is at least a possibility that some of the risk 
attitudes have persisted over time and it may be difficult to pick up the emerging differences. 
Finally, this research does not observe migration within a province nor can we account for the 
duration of a move. It is likely, for example, that short-term internal migration is subject to 
lower risks than long-term moves, which would have been more typical for immigrants from 
Europe.  
Overall, despite controlling for a wide variety of personal characteristics, differences in 
insurance supply and geographic variation in insurance holding, the differential between the 
life insurance demand of immigrants and native-born Canadians remains. As such we 
tentatively interpret these findings as evidence of differences in attitudes towards risk; that 
immigrants display relatively lower risk aversion and as a result, demand less insurance.  
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1 Note that informal insurance providers, such as burial societies, were often established by and for members 
of particular ethnic groups. In section 5, we also provide an analysis of the insurance price paid by immigrants 
and do not find any significant deviation from the price paid by Canadians. 
2 Missing data on income reduces the number of observations to just below 40,000 in the baseline regressions. 
The main results presented in the paper would remain consistent if we dropped the income measures and 
worked with the full sample of household heads (not reported). 
3 Those policies might also have been a response to an overall racial animosity of the Canadian population 
towards Asian immigrants (Ward, 1990).  
4 Nominal values deflated using Wholesale Price Indices from Mitchell (2007). 
5 However, both countries had less extensive life insurance coverage than the United States at this time, as can 
be seen in Table 1. 
6 Identified when occupation is described as “Insurance agents and brokers” and totalled over the same 
ethnicity as the individual (as indicated by the racial or tribal origin of individual given in census), divided by 
population and expressed for each census district per 1,000 citizen. 
7 See footnote 11 for details. 
8 The difference between the proportion of immigrants and Canadians holding life insurance is equal to 5.6 
percentage points and is highly statistically significant. 
9 A more fine-grained division of occupation was included in regressions not reported here. The main results of 
this paper however remain unchanged. 
10 38 per cent of household heads were classified as “Farmer (owners and tenants)” 
11 As the enumerators were not instructed to differentiate between farmers who owned their own farm and 
tenant farmers, the limitations of the data prevent an examination of this effect in isolation. See Offer (1991) 
for a discussion of determinants of farm tenure in England. 
12 Household income includes all income from family members and non-family members of the household. 
13 A set of diagnostics has been conducted. First, an OLS regression is implemented using the same dependent 
and independent variables as the initial Probit model, and the variables are checked for collinearity. Judging on 
Variance Inflation Factors, no serious problems with collinearity among these variables has been detected. 
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Second, a link test is carried out in order to check for a specification error such as omitted variables. The test 
confirms that meaningful predictors have been chosen, and as the link test is not significant, the model is quite 
unlikely to be misspecified. Third, a Wald chi-squared test is conducted, and a resulting p-value which is 
significant at the one per cent level indicates that the model has at least some degree of explanatory power. 
Finally, Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test indicates that the model fits the data well. 
14 We assume that the decision to migrate would not have been made by the individual if they were below 
sixteen years of age. This specification also addresses the issue of ‘Home Children’ immigrants whose passage 
was subsidised. As many as 80,000 children emigrated from Britain to Canada with the backing of charitable 
organisations between 1868 and 1924, with approximately 30,000 arriving between 1901 and 1913 (Parr, 1994; 
Canada Yearbook, 1912 p.46). It is estimated that perhaps 12% of immigrants living in Canada in 1901 were 
former Home Children (Green et al., 2002). 
15 An alternative way of measuring age effects would be to include a full set of age dummies to control for life 
cycle changes. This approach delivers very consistent estimates (not reported). 
16 We have also tried numerous alterations in order to capture the effect of children. Including an indicator 
function for the presence of children or a full set of dummies for each number of children does not yield any 
significant children effects, as does controlling for the age of dependent children (not reported).   
17 In an identical regression (not reported) the “official language” variable was separated into those who could 
speak English and those who could speak French. The results indicate that speaking English was associated with 
a higher probability of holding life insurance than speaking French. 
18 The only insignificant difference is found between occupations in agriculture and the fisheries and hunting 
professions, probably the most similar professions. The smallest significant differences are disclosed for the 
mining, followed by building trades; both professions appear to be particularly risky and may hence attract 
unusually risk-friendly workers. An alternative way of measuring income is by accounting for the share of family 
income that the household-head earns. We show in the Appendix Table A1 that the inclusion of a variable 
measuring the household-head share of household income does not change the results. Since this test leads to 
a rather large drop in the number of observations, we report this model only as a robustness check.  
19 We have also conducted the analyses separately for sub-samples of farmers and non-farmers. The results 
remain consistent within each sub-sample (not reported).  
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20 We do not present the differences across provinces in the baseline specification and refer the reader to 
Appendix Table A2.  
21 Another possible unobserved driver of the results in Di Matteo and Emery (2002) is the origin of the individual, 
which is not included in their main specification and yet, as observed here, there exist a relatively large 
differences in religion between Canadians and immigrants (Table 2). 
22 Quebec and Ontario were the two largest provinces in terms of population and also the most urbanised, 
hence they are grouped together in this context. In the Appendix Table A3 we estimate separate models for 
the sub-samples of Ontario, Quebec, Eastern or Western provinces (columns 1 to 4). We also conduct further 
sub-sampling into urban only or rural only respondents (columns 5 and 6). It can be viewed that the lower 
intake by immigrants is consistent in sign and significance in each of these additional specifications.  
23 For example immigrants to Saskatchewan and Alberta arrived on average around 7-8 years prior to 1911, 
while immigrants in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia arrived on average 28 and 17 years previously, 
respectively. The corresponding figures for other provinces are Ontario (25 years), Quebec (16 years), 
Manitoba (13 years), British Columbia (12 years), New Brunswick (28 years) and Prince Edward Island (43 
years). 
24 Using Clarify software (Tomz et al., 2003). 
25 For further relevant discussion see Attanasio and Hoynes (2000). 
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8. Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Life Insurance Premium Income per capita (US$), 1911. 
  Canada US UK 
Total Life Premium Income 31,619,626 625,900,000 223,663,500 
Population 7,206,643 93,863,000 44,916,000 
GDP per capita (1990 Int. GK$) 4,213 5,406 4,709 
Premium Income per capita 4.39 6.67 4.98 
Sources: Canada Yearbook (1912), United States Bureau of the Census (1976), Sheppard 
(2013), Flandreau and Zumer (2004), Powell (2005), Maddison (2013). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 5% Sample, Household-heads only. 
 Native-born Canadians  Immigrants 
 Mean Std. dev. Obs.  Mean Std. dev. Obs. 
 Panel A: Household Controls 
Male 0.91 0.28 53,854  0.94 0.24 18,509 
Age 45.29 14.42 53,854  42.48 14.24 18,509 
Married 0.81 0.39 53,854  0.78 0.42 18,509 
Number of 
Dependent Children 1.83 2.07 53,854  1.49 1.84 18,509 
 Panel B: Country of Birth and Migration 
Canada 1.00 0.00 53,854     
England     0.34 0.47 18,509 
USA     0.15 0.36 18,509 
Scotland     0.11 0.31 18,509 
Ireland     0.06 0.24 18,509 
Russia     0.05 0.22 18,509 
Germany     0.03 0.17 18,509 
Austria     0.03 0.18 18,509 
Sweden     0.02 0.14 18,509 
Italy     0.02 0.13 18,509 
China     0.14 0.35 18,509 
Rest of Europe     0.01 0.10 18,509 
Rest of World     0.02 0.13 18,509 
Years Since 
Immigration     11.44 12.52 16,602 
Adult Internal 
Migrant 0.14 0.35 53,854     
 Panel C: Life Insurance 
Life Insurance 0.31 0.46 53,854  0.24 0.43 18,509 
Value of Life 
Insurance ($) 2,029 3,593 16,842  1,955 4,916 4,477 
Premium Life 
Insurance ($) 86 364 13,820  82 365 3,901 
Insurance Supply 
Proxy 0.25 0.18 53,684  0.16 0.15 18,478 
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 Panel D: Occupation 
Occ 0 - Agriculture 0.45 0.50 47,609  0.40 0.49 16,605 
Occ 1 - Building 
trades 0.09 0.29 47,609  0.40 0.49 16,605 
Occ 2 - Domestic and 
personal service 0.03 0.18 47,609  0.10 0.30 16,605 
Occ 3 - Civil and 
municipal service  0.03 0.18 47,609  0.04 0.19 16,605 
Occ 4 - Fisheries and 
hunting 0.02 0.13 47,609  0.04 0.20 16,605 
Occ 5 - Forestry and 
lumbering 0.04 0.20 47,609  0.01 0.09 16,605 
Occ 6 - Manufactures 
(mechanical) 0.06 0.23 47,609  0.03 0.16 16,605 
Occ 7 - Manufactures 
(Food & clothing) 0.05 0.21 47,609  0.07 0.26 16,605 
Occ 8 - Mining 0.02 0.13 47,609  0.05 0.22 16,605 
Occ 9 - Professional 
pursuits  0.03 0.16 47,609  0.04 0.19 16,605 
Occ 10 - Trade and 
Merchandising 0.11 0.31 47,609  0.03 0.17 16,605 
Occ 11 - 
Transportation 0.08 0.27 47,609  0.11 0.31 16,605 
Self-Employed-
Farmer-Employer 0.37 0.48 53,854  0.32 0.47 18,509 
Income of Household 
Head (last year) ($) 735 903 23,016  772 983 8,654 
Total Income of 
Household (last year) 
($) 
981 1425 31,103  1410 2135 10,816 
Second Income 0.21 0.41 53,854  0.26 0.44 18,509 
Household-head 
share of Household 
Income (last year) ($) 
0.82 0.27 23,013  0.76 0.32 8,650 
 Panel E: Literacy & Language 
Read and Write 0.89 0.31 50,541  0.92 0.27 18,509 
Speaks English 0.76 0.43 53,854  0.86 0.34 18,509 
Speaks French 0.32 0.46 53,854  0.05 0.21 18,509 
 Panel F: Religion 
Catholic 0.41 0.49 53,854  0.19 0.39 18,509 
Anglican 0.11 0.31 53,854  0.25 0.43 18,509 
Methodist 0.18 0.39 53,854  0.12 0.32 18,509 
Baptist 0.06 0.24 53,854  0.04 0.19 18,509 
Presbyterian 0.17 0.38 53,854  0.16 0.37 18,509 
Protestant 0.00 0.05 53,854  0.01 0.11 18,509 
Lutheran 0.01 0.11 53,854  0.09 0.29 18,509 
Jewish 0.00 0.04 53,854  0.03 0.18 18,509 
Other Religion 0.04 0.21 53,854  0.11 0.31 18,509 
 Panel G: Geography 
Urban 0.43 0.50 53,854  0.52 0.50 18,509 
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Alberta 0.03 0.17 53,854  0.15 0.36 18,509 
British Columbia 0.03 0.17 53,854  0.14 0.34 18,509 
Manitoba 0.04 0.20 53,854  0.13 0.33 18,509 
New Brunswick 0.06 0.23 53,854  0.01 0.11 18,509 
Nova Scotia 0.08 0.27 53,854  0.02 0.15 18,509 
Ontario 0.39 0.49 53,854  0.30 0.46 18,509 
Prince Edward Island 0.02 0.13 53,854  0.00 0.04 18,509 
Quebec 0.30 0.46 53,854  0.09 0.29 18,509 
Saskatchewan 0.04 0.21 53,854  0.17 0.37 18,509 
Source: 5% Sample of Census of Canada, 1911, CCRI. 
Note: Sample sizes differ due to missing data for particular variables (e.g. insurance 
premiums) 
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Table 3. The Demand for Life Insurance and Immigration. 
 Life Insurance 
 Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Immigrant -0.128***  -0.111***  
 (0.00616)  (0.00651)  
USA  -0.0648***   
  (0.0136)   
England  -0.0823***   
  (0.00793)   
Ireland  -0.0630***   
  (0.0172)   
Scotland  -0.0346**   
  (0.0137)   
Germany  -0.126***   
  (0.0256)   
Italy  -0.312***   
  (0.0130)   
Russia  -0.288***   
  (0.0120)   
Sweden  -0.170***   
  (0.0320)   
Austria  -0.304***   
  (0.0145)   
Rest of Europe  -0.174***   
  (0.0119)   
China  -0.335***   
  (0.0181)   
Rest of World  -0.181***   
  (0.0274)   
Male 0.214*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0138) 
Married 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.133*** 
 (0.00852) (0.00858) (0.00854) (0.00843) 
Age 0.0206*** 0.0198*** 0.0199*** 0.0214*** 
 (0.00146) (0.00145) (0.00146) (0.00146) 
Age2 -0.00025*** -0.00023*** -0.00024*** -0.00025*** 
 (1.62e-05) (1.61e-05) (1.61e-05) (1.61e-05) 
Dependent children -0.000435 0.000878 0.00154 -0.00206 
 (0.00146) (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.00145) 
Literate 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.195*** 
 (0.00847) (0.00869) (0.00871) (0.00815) 
Speaks official 
language 
0.139*** 0.0984*** 0.112*** 0.128*** 
(0.0112) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0115) 
Urban agglomeration 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
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 (0.00688) (0.00687) (0.00688) (0.00681) 
Household income 0.0287*** 0.0305*** 0.0281*** 0.0275*** 
 (0.00532) (0.00530) (0.00549) (0.00519) 
(Household income)2 -0.00105*** -0.00111*** -0.000993** -0.00104*** 
 (0.000406) (0.000403) (0.000417) (0.000394) 
Farmer 0.0140 0.0186 0.0142 0.0113 
 (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
Insurance supply 0.132*** 0.0710*** 0.111*** 0.0573*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0188) (0.0170) 
Anglican   0.00902  
   (0.00921)  
Methodist   0.0705***  
   (0.00966)  
Baptist   0.0385***  
   (0.0132)  
Presbyterian   0.0710***  
   (0.00951)  
Protestant   0.0192  
   (0.0396)  
Lutheran   -0.0479***  
   (0.0186)  
Jewish   -0.204***  
   (0.0185)  
other   -0.0165  
   (0.0134)  
Immigrant * East    -0.0577** 
    (0.0256) 
Immigrant * Center    -0.107*** 
    (0.00741) 
Immigrant * West    -0.162*** 
    (0.00987) 
East    -0.143*** 
    (0.00813) 
West    -0.0256** 
    (0.0100) 
     
Province controls yes yes yes  
Occupation controls yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 37,977 37,977 37,977 37,977 
Pseudo-R2 0.126 0.133 0.131 0.122 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted categories - Country (column 
2): Canada, Religion: Roman Catholic, Region: Center. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Life Insurance Demand and Assimilation. 




 Probit OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Years since 
immigration 
0.0106*** 0.0448*** 0.0110*** 
(0.00104) (0.00367) (0.00157) 
(Years since 
immigration)2 
-0.000107*** -0.00048*** -0.00013*** 
(2.01e-05) (7.15e-05) (3.30e-05) 
USA -0.158*** -0.392*** 0.0215 
 (0.0135) (0.0583) (0.0272) 
England -0.181*** -1.117*** -0.215*** 
 (0.00953) (0.0447) (0.0155) 
Ireland -0.196*** -0.974*** -0.256*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0758) (0.0307) 
Scotland -0.135*** -0.874*** -0.116*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0531) (0.0205) 
Germany -0.233*** -0.717*** -0.249*** 
 (0.0190) (0.110) (0.0466) 
Italy -0.335*** -1.129*** -0.251*** 
 (0.00836) (0.188) (0.0364) 
Russia -0.319*** -0.808*** -0.203*** 
 (0.00852) (0.118) (0.0323) 
Sweden -0.240*** -0.968*** -0.0401 
 (0.0247) (0.153) (0.0575) 
Austria -0.327*** -0.602*** -0.289*** 
 (0.0101) (0.134) (0.0397) 
Rest of Europe -0.263*** -0.916*** -0.206*** 
 (0.00993) (0.0690) (0.0243) 
China -0.350*** -1.509*** -0.466*** 
 (0.00947) (0.0698) (0.0767) 
Rest of World -0.252*** -0.851*** -0.322*** 
 (0.0214) (0.136) (0.0492) 
Male 0.224*** 1.005*** 0.581*** 
 (0.0130) (0.106) (0.0340) 
Married 0.124*** 0.0301 0.108*** 
 (0.00873) (0.0330) (0.0150) 
Age 0.0197*** 0.0328*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00513) (0.00212) 
Age2 -0.000247*** -0.00036*** -0.00037*** 
 (1.69e-05) (5.95e-05) (2.44e-05) 
Dependent children 0.000316 -0.0129*** -0.00288 
 (0.00149) (0.00446) (0.00215) 
Literate 0.173*** 0.460*** 0.252*** 
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 (0.00876) (0.0467) (0.0141) 
Speaks official 
language 
0.0935*** 0.0771 0.174*** 
(0.0127) (0.0512) (0.0190) 
Urban agglomeration 0.114*** 0.0183 0.274*** 
 (0.00695) (0.0221) (0.00983) 
Household income 0.0306*** 0.127***  
 (0.00519) (0.0128)  
(Household income)² -0.00111*** -0.00204**  
 (0.000394) (0.000946)  
Farmer 0.0171 0.0904* -0.0212 
 (0.0146) (0.0473) (0.0245) 
Insurance supply 0.0617*** -0.176***  
 (0.0195) (0.0591)  
Second income   0.0418*** 
   (0.00819) 
    
Province controls yes yes yes 
Occupation controls yes yes yes 
    
Observations 36,911 14,313 29,932 
R2 0.139 0.195 0.265 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) reports the 
pseudo-R2 coefficient. Columns (2) and (3) include a constant (not 
reported). Omitted categories - Country: Canada *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
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 Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) 
   
Internal migrant -0.00884  
 (0.0158)  
(Internal migrant) * (Born in East)  -0.261*** 
  (0.0919) 
(Internal migrant) * (Born in Center)  -0.114** 
  (0.0572) 
(Internal migrant) * (Born in West)  -0.170** 
  (0.0839) 
(Internal migrant) * East  0.302** 
  (0.154) 
(Internal migrant) * Center  0.118* 
  (0.0682) 
(Internal migrant) * West  0.263*** 
  (0.0922) 
East  -0.274** 
  (0.106) 
West  -0.147** 
  (0.0582) 
Male 0.254*** 0.251*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0150) 
Married 0.124*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0108) 
Age 0.0201*** 0.0209*** 






 (2.05e-05) (2.05e-05) 
Dependent children -0.000196 -0.00206 
 (0.00174) (0.00171) 
Literate 0.175*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00974) 
Speaks official language 0.0208 0.000462 
 (0.0172) (0.0174) 
Urban agglomeration 0.128*** 0.129*** 
 (0.00816) (0.00812) 
Household income 0.0571*** 0.0564*** 
 (0.00558) (0.00563) 
(Household income) 2 -0.00345*** -0.00342*** 
 (0.000541) (0.000550) 
Farmer 0.0399** 0.0385** 
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 (0.0172) (0.0172) 
Insurance supply 0.000132 0.000265 
 (0.000937) (0.000923) 
   
Province controls yes  
Birth province controls yes  
Occupation controls yes yes 
   
Observations 26,415 26,497 
R2 0.143  0.139 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted categories - 
Region: Center. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6. The Demand for Life Insurance and Internal Migration. 
 ln(Premium of Life Insurance) 
 OLS 
 (1) (2) 
   
Immigrant 0.0105  
 (0.0396)  
Internal migrant  0.0471 
  (0.0466) 




   
Individual and household 
controls  yes yes 
Province controls yes yes 
Occupation controls yes yes 
Insurance supply controls yes yes 
Country of birth controls yes  
Province of birth controls  yes 
   
Observations 11,985 8,643 
R2 0.365 0.348 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions 
include a complete set of control variables, that is individual and 
household level controls (gender, civil status, quadratic age 
polynomial, number of dependent children, literacy, official 
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language, urban agglomeration, quadratic household income 
polynomial, farmer), province of residence, occupation and 
insurance supply controls. The specification in column (1) 
contains in addition country of birth controls, whereas column (2) 
includes province of birth controls (not reported). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figure 1. Probability of having life insurance and age (by country of origin). 
Note: Probabilities of having life insurance are obtained by the means of Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques and based on the model outlined in column (2) of Table 3.  
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Note: Probabilities of having life insurance are obtained by the means of Monte Carlo simulation 




























Russia Rest of Europe
Rest of World
  48 
9. Appendix 
Table A1. Robustness Checks: The Demand for Life Insurance with controls for household-
head share of household income. 
 Life Insurance 
 Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Immigrant -0.126***  -0.108***  
 (0.00690)  (0.00731)  
USA  -0.0611***   
  (0.0158)   
England  -0.0824***   
  (0.00877)   
Ireland  -0.0727***   
  (0.0190)   
Scotland  -0.0344**   
  (0.0152)   
Germany  -0.148***   
  (0.0285)   
Italy  -0.246***   
  (0.0305)   
Russia  -0.303***   
  (0.0140)   
Sweden  -0.168***   
  (0.0374)   
Austria  -0.319***   
  (0.0173)   
Rest of Europe  -0.170***   
  (0.0138)   
China  -0.182***   
  (0.0323)   
Rest of World  -0.0611***   
  (0.0158)   
Male 0.196*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0187) 
Married 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.137*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0101) 
Age 0.0203*** 0.0194*** 0.0196*** 0.0210*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00167) 
Age2 -0.00023*** -0.00022*** -0.00023*** -0.00024*** 
 (1.88e-05) (1.88e-05) (1.88e-05) (1.88e-05) 
Dependent children 0.000953 0.00223 0.00263 -0.000466 
 (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00164) 
Literate 0.172*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00995) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00969) 
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Speaks official 
language 
0.133*** 0.0922*** 0.111*** 0.123*** 
(0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0130) 
Urban agglomeration 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (0.00756) (0.00756) (0.00757) (0.00749) 
Household income 0.0631*** 0.0647*** 0.0619*** 0.0624*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0100) 
(Household income)2 -0.00202*** -0.00207*** -0.00196*** -0.00202*** 
 (0.000714) (0.000703) (0.000747) (0.000702) 
Household-head share 
of household income  
0.196*** 0.188*** 0.191*** 0.196*** 
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0166) 
Farmer -0.0284 -0.0260 -0.0248 -0.0380** 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0177) 
Insurance supply 0.136*** 0.0753*** 0.115*** 0.0677*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0191) 
Anglican   -0.00520  
   (0.0102)  
Methodist   0.0551***  
   (0.0109)  
Baptist   0.0187  
   (0.0146)  
Presbyterian   0.0546***  
   (0.0107)  
Protestant   0.0285  
   (0.0428)  
Lutheran   -0.0604***  
   (0.0209)  
Jewish   -0.225***  
   (0.0209)  
Other   -0.0171  
   (0.0150)  
Immigrant * East    -0.0714*** 
    (0.0274) 
Immigrant * Center    -0.109*** 
    (0.00811) 
Immigrant * West    -0.152*** 
    (0.0121) 
East    -0.144*** 
    (0.00945) 
West    -0.0590*** 
    (0.0119) 
     
Province controls yes yes yes  
Occupation controls yes yes yes yes 
     
Observations 30,665 30,665 30,665 30,665 
Pseudo-R2 0.132 0.136 0.136 0.128 
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted categories - Country (column 
2): Canada, Religion: Roman Catholic, Region: Center. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 






   
Immigrant * provinceNS -0.0747** 
 (0.0324) 
Immigrant * provincePEI -0.175 
 (0.117) 
Immigrant * provinceNB 0.00556 
 (0.0445) 
Immigrant * provinceQC -0.132*** 
 (0.0137) 
Immigrant * provinceON -0.110*** 
 (0.00848) 
Immigrant * provinceMB -0.192*** 
 (0.0154) 
Immigrant * provinceSK -0.163*** 
 (0.0219) 
Immigrant * provinceAB -0.148*** 
 (0.0218) 
Immigrant * provinceBC -0.112*** 














Speaks official language 0.137*** 
 (0.0112) 
Urban agglomeration 0.112*** 
 (0.00689) 
Household income 0.0284*** 
 (0.00531) 

















































Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3. Robustness Checks: Sub-sampling by Region and Type of Settlement. 
 Life Insurance 
 Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Province Urban Rural 
       
Immigrant -0.162*** -0.121*** -0.142*** -0.0368* -0.160*** -0.0545*** 
 (0.0160) (0.00987) (0.0111) (0.0190) (0.00779) (0.00935) 
Male 0.247*** 0.244*** 0.184*** 0.0988*** 0.235*** 0.162*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0247) (0.0239) (0.0306) (0.0207) (0.0137) 
Married 0.103*** 0.138*** 0.128*** 0.0963*** 0.141*** 0.0996*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0158) (0.0136) (0.0173) (0.0133) (0.00882) 
Age 0.0130*** 0.0232*** 0.0221*** 0.0215*** 0.0180*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00293) (0.00226) (0.00339) (0.00316) (0.00192) (0.00185) 




 (3.31e-05) (2.45e-05) (4.00e-05) (3.41e-05) (2.14e-05) (2.03e-05) 
Dependent 
children 
0.00489* -0.00281 0.00161 -0.00371 0.00138 -0.00205 
 (0.00252) (0.00268) (0.00335) (0.00296) (0.00201) (0.00179) 
Literate 0.181*** 0.207*** 0.200*** 0.0803*** 0.172*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0172) (0.0144) (0.00808) 
Speaks official 
language 
0.200*** 0.0931*** 0.202*** 0.0299 0.153*** 0.108*** 
(0.0348) (0.0192) (0.0158) (0.0239) (0.0166) (0.0117) 
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Urban 
agglomeration 
0.105*** 0.146*** 0.0606*** 0.0648***   
 (0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0144)   
Household 
income 
0.0345*** 0.0330*** 0.0360*** 0.110*** 0.0312*** 0.0306*** 
 (0.00670) (0.00765) (0.00522) (0.0135) (0.00470) (0.00471) 
(Household 
income)2 




 (0.000264) (0.000859) (0.000323) (0.00206) (0.000389) (0.000285) 
Farmer -0.0554* 0.0151 0.0674** 0.0111 0.0141 0.0205 
 (0.0319) (0.0220) (0.0318) (0.0321) (0.0403) (0.0128) 
Insurance 
supply 
0.0619* 0.144*** 0.407*** -0.0410 0.139*** 0.0957*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0289) (0.0562) (0.0576) (0.0228) (0.0262) 
       
Province 
controls 
  yes yes yes yes 
Occupation 
controls 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 10,337 14,638 7,781 5,118 22,976 14,898 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
 
 
 
